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Abstract 
 
I argue that, if we take the world-time parallel seriously, then those who support Sider’s (2001) argument 
for unrestricted diachronic composition (UDC), establishing the existence of temporal parts, should also 
hold that its modal analogue, my argument for unrestricted modal composition (UMC), establishes the 
existence of modal parts. I formulate the latter argument and develop it by testing it against objections. 
 
 
 
Ted Sider’s Four-Dimensionalism (2001) has been influential in framing the 
contemporary metaphysical debate concerning persistence. Sider offers several 
compelling arguments favoring the existence of temporal parts, chief among them his 
‘Argument from Vagueness’ – or the argument for unrestricted diachronic composition 
(UDC), as I will call it. I argue that if we take the world-time parallel seriously, then 
those who hold that the UDC establishes the existence of temporal parts should also 
hold that its modal analogue, the argument for unrestricted modal composition (UMC), 
establishes the existence of modal parts. Just as UDC establishes that ordinary objects 
are temporally extended mereological composites (composed of temporal parts), UMC 
establishes that ordinary objects are modally extended mereological composites 
(composed of modal parts).1 UDC grants the existence of objects entirely composed of, 
say, the molecules in David Lewis’s hand in 1980 and the molecules in Ursa Major in 
1950, whereas UMC grants the existence of objects entirely composed of, say, Ted 
Sider (who exists in the actual world) and a unicorn (which exists in a non-actual 
possible world). I claim that there is at least as good a reason to believe that UDC 
establishes the existence of temporal-mereological composites as there is to believe that 
UMC establishes the existence of modal-mereological composites. First, I outline UDC 
(§1). Next, I argue that there is good reason to believe the world-time parallel to be a 
metaphysical parallel. Then I formulate UMC (§2). Finally, I raise and respond to the 
following objections:  UMC is committed to possibilism; UMC does not motivate the 
idea that the parthood relation can occur across worlds (§3). 
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1. Sider’s Argument for UDC 
 
The soundness of UDC has been hotly debated in the secondary literature, but I do not 
attempt to contribute to this debate here. Rather, I argue that if UDC is sound, then 
UMC is also likely to be sound. Or, alternatively, I argue that since the conclusion of 
UDC is that objects have temporal parts, the soundness of UDC implies that there is as 
good a reason to believe that objects have modal parts as there is to believe that objects 
have temporal parts.   
 
The idea of an object’s having modal parts has been little-explored in contemporary 
literature –discussion of modal parts, however, has not been completely neglected. 
Modal continuants, for example, are entities with modal parts and have been offered as 
a way to preserve counterpart-theoretic-style semantics for de re modality while also 
avoiding the Humphrey objection levied against counterpart theory (Lewis 1983:41).2 
But what the arguments for modal continuants do not establish is that objects can 
indeed have modal parts – the existence of trans-world composites (and their modal 
parts) is simply assumed and the benefits of these assumptions analyzed.3 UMC, 
however, will motivate the existence of modal parts, so my thesis can be seen to have 
utility outside of metaphysical persistence debates. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, I will assume the soundness of Sider’s UDC and hold 
fixed all of his presuppositions that are needed for UDC to succeed. This means that I 
will assume – with Sider (2001:120) – the linguistic theory of vagueness (i.e. vagueness 
is a linguistic phenomenon) and maintain the assumption that eternalism is true (110). 
For ease of exposition, I will also adopt Sider’s terminology. Call an assignment, f(t), a 
t-assignment iff f(t) is any function taking one or more times as inputs and assigning 
non-empty classes of objects that exist at those times as outputs (133);4 say that a class 
of objects is a temporal case of composition, or t-case, whenever the objects in that 
class stand in important temporal-mereological relations (e.g. spatial adjacency, 
qualitative similarity, causal relatedness, etc.); and n number of t-cases form a 
continuous series iff each t-case is pair-wise similar (134). I follow Sider and define 
‘temporal part’ as follows (59): 
 
(TP) x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at time t =def (1) x exists at, but 
            only at, t; (2) x is part of y at t; and (3) x overlaps everything that is a 
            part of y at t.5 
 
Finally, x is a minimal D-fusion of f(t) iff (1) for all t in the domain of f(t), x is a fusion-
at-t of f(t); and (2) for all t’ such that t’ is not in the domain of f(t), x is not a fusion-at-
t’.6 
 
Consider now, Sider’s formulation of UDC (134): 
Res Cogitans (2013) 4                                                                                                         Ueberroth | 4 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
 
P1 If not every t-assignment has a minimal D-fusion, then there must be a 
            pair of t-cases connected by a ‘continuous series’ such that in one, 
            minimal D-fusion occurs, but in the other, minimal D-fusion does not 
            occur. 
P2 In no continuous series of t-cases is there a sharp cut-off in whether 
            minimal D-fusion occurs. 
P3 In any t-case of minimal D-fusion, either minimal D-fusion definitely 
            occurs or minimal D-fusion definitely does not occur. 
 
P1 would only be denied by mereological nihilists, those who hold that minimal D-
fusion never occurs.7 However, the nihilist position faces a significant problem:  if 
gunk (an object all of whose proper parts have proper parts) is possible – and it prima 
facie appears to be – then mereological nihilism if false.8 It is to be understood, then, 
that the mereological nihilist cannot simply assert the falsity of P1 without first arguing 
against the possibility of gunk (179-80), so it is dialectically appropriate to consider P1 
true. 
 
P2 is supported by the idea that any sharp cut-off is “metaphysically arbitrary” (124). 
Suppose further that a sharp cut-off were motivated in a non-arbitrary way; for 
instance, let minimal D-fusion occur only over a continuous interval of time, or let a set 
of definite topological restrictions on space-time dictate when minimal D-fusion 
occurs:  the existence of temporal parts would still be established by UDC (136).9 
 
Support P3 with the following argument: if P3 is false, then possibly it is a vague 
matter whether some object x is a minimal D-fusion. Since P3 could be false in a world 
with finitely many objects, then a statement asserting ‘there are exactly n number of 
objects’ would have an indeterminate truth-value in this world because it would always 
be vague whether the objects in this world composed a further object, namely a 
minimal D-fusion. But sentences of the form ‘there are exactly n number of objects’ 
cannot have indeterminate truth-values, so P3 is not false (127). Recall Sider’s 
assumption above that vagueness is a linguistic – not a metaphysical - phenomenon; 
now understand the denial of P3 to entail metaphysical vagueness, which contradicts 
the assumption. 
 
P1, P2, and P3 entail a principle of unrestricted diachronic composition: for any number 
of times tp and any number of objects xq existing at those times there is an object y that 
is the minimal D-fusion of xq at tp. P1 requires that a restriction on when minimal D-
fusion occurs requires a continuous series of t-cases where in at least one t-case, 
minimal D-fusion occurs, and in an adjacent t-case, minimal D-fusion does not occur. 
P3 requires a sharp cut-off in the continuous series of t-cases and P2 prohibits a sharp 
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cut-off. Therefore, minimal D-fusion always occurs and, where there is minimal D-
fusion, there are temporal parts. 
2. The World-Time Parallel and the Argument for UMC 
 
The world-time parallel is a parallel that exists between tense logics and modal logics. 
Specifically, the parallel occurs between the tense operators ‘always’/‘sometimes’ and 
the modal operators ‘necessarily’/‘possibly’ in model theories of tense and modal logic. 
These four operators interact with the axioms of their respective models in similar ways 
and, due to the semantic similarities between the operators, formal results proved in one 
model typically have analogous results in the other model (Meyer 2006:25).  It is this 
part of the world-time parallel that everybody can agree with: the formal results are 
apparent and cannot be readily denied. Where the world-time parallel becomes 
controversial is when it is applied to metaphysics whereupon it states that the 
metaphysical nature and ontological status of times and possible worlds should parallel 
one another: arguments given for/against the existence of times should have analogous 
arguments for/against the existence of possible worlds and vice versa. This 
metaphysical parallel is not entirely unmotivated, especially when one considers the 
nature of arguments given in the metaphysics of time and possible worlds. For example, 
an eternalist may object that the presentist’s tense-logical model cannot account for the 
truth of sentences involving diachronic relations. A possibilist can analogously object 
that the actualist’s modal-logical model cannot account for the truth of sentences 
involving trans-world relations. These analogous arguments can be made because many 
take ontological commitment to be a function of what entities are quantified over in the 
logical models used to represent metaphysical talk about worlds, times, etc.10 If the 
specified domain of a presentist model must include only present objects, yet that 
model nevertheless quantifies over non-present entities, one has reason to believe that 
the presentist model does not accurately reflect the metaphysical structure of the world. 
Since tense models and modal models are analogous, there is strong reason to suppose 
that there are analogous reasons for rejecting an actualist model. Thus the world-time 
parallel between tense and modal-logical models suggests a parallel between the 
metaphysics of time and the metaphysics of possible worlds. 
 
I say that a metaphysical world-time parallel is suggested – or strongly implied – by the 
logical parallel, not that it is entailed. There is, in fact, an interesting way in which the 
metaphysical parallel is broken that is pertinent to the topic of this paper. First, 
distinguish between temporal versions of a principle of unrestricted composition:  
unrestricted synchronic composition versus unrestricted diachronic composition 
(Balashov 2010:78-9). The former asserts that at any time t, any class of objects 
existing at t has a minimal fusion-at-t. The latter asserts that at any times t1, t2, …, tn, 
any class of objects existing at t1, t2, …, tn has a minimal D-fusion. Notice that the 
diachronic principle entails the synchronic principle.11 Now consider a similar 
distinction between modal principles: unrestricted intra-world composition versus 
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unrestricted inter-world composition. The former asserts that in any world w, any class 
of objects existing in w has a minimal fusion-in-w, and the latter states that in any 
worlds w1, w2, …, wn, any class of objects existing in w1, w2, …, wn has a minimal 
fusion. Notice that the inter-world principle entails the intra-world principle. Notice 
also that, under the assumption of eternalism, the intra-world principle is equivalent to 
the diachronic principle. Therefore, a principle of unrestricted inter-world composition 
– which is established by UMC – entails a principle of unrestricted diachronic 
composition – which is established by UDC – though the reverse does not hold. Yet 
this metaphysical asymmetry does not show that the world-time parallel is a useless 
tool. Since the parallel nevertheless remains between logical models, and since 
metaphysicians often follow the ontological commitments of the logical models they 
use, there remains a prima facie reason to investigate the world-time parallel in other 
metaphysical scenarios. 
 
We can now introduce the assumptions needed for UMC, i.e., modal analogues of the 
assumptions Sider utilized in UDC. I continue to assume that vagueness is a linguistic 
phenomenon. In addition to assuming eternalism I also assume its modal analogue, 
possibilism, the thesis asserting that possible but non-actual entities exist.12 
 
Modal terminology for UMC can also be introduced, where the modal terms are 
analogous to Sider’s temporal terminology for UDC.  Call an assignment, f’(m), an m-
assignment iff f’(m) is any function taking one or more worlds as inputs and assigning 
non-empty classes of objects that exist in those worlds as outputs; say that a class of 
objects is a modal case of composition, or m-case, whenever the objects in that class 
stand in important modal-mereological relations (e.g. qualitative similarity, 
counterfactual dependence, counterpart or rigid designation relations, etc.); and n 
number of m-cases form a continuous series iff each m-case is pair-wise similar.  
Define a modal part as follows: 
 
(MP) x is a world-restricted modal part of y in world w =def (1) x exists in, but 
            only in, w; (2) x is part of y in w; and (3) x overlaps everything that is a 
            part of y in w. 
 
Finally, call x a minimal M-fusion of f’(m) iff (1) for all w in the domain of f’(m), x is a 
fusion-in-w of f’(m); and (2) for all w’ such that w’ is not in the domain of f’(m), x is 
not a fusion-in-w’. 
 
Now UMC may be formulated as follows: 
 
P1* If not every m-assignment has a minimal M-fusion, then there must be a 
            pair of m-cases connected by a ‘continuous series’ such that in one, 
            minimal M-fusion occurs, but in the other, minimal M-fusion does not 
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            occur. 
P2* In no continuous series of m-cases is there a sharp cut-off in whether 
            minimal M-fusion occurs. 
P3* In any m-case of minimal M-fusion, either minimal M-fusion definitely 
            occurs or minimal M-fusion definitely does not occur. 
 
Again, P1* will only be denied by one who asserts that minimal M-fusion never occurs, 
i.e. a mereological nihilist. But once again the nihilist must first argue against the 
possibility of gunk if P1* is to be denied. 
 
Let us try, in opposition to P2*, to motivate a sharp cut-off for when minimal M-fusion 
occurs; say, x is a minimal M-fusion of f’(m1) iff some class S1 is the output of f’(m1) 
and every member of S1 is either x or a counterpart of x that exists in the closest non-
actual possible world.13 Assuming we can mark a sharp cut-off for which worlds are 
‘closest’ to the actual world, the above characterization would, if properly motivated, 
result in a sharp cut-off for when minimal M-fusion occurs. However, this sharp cut-off 
still grants the existence of modal parts, so P2* is vindicated. 
 
The support for P3* will be similar to the support for P3. If P3* is false, then there can 
be m-cases where it is vague whether minimal M-fusion occurs. If it is vague whether 
minimal M-fusion occurs, then statements of the form ‘there exist exactly k number of 
objects between worlds w1, w2, …, and wn’ would have indeterminate truth-values when 
worlds w1, w2, …, and wn contain a finite number of objects. But since possibilism and 
the linguistic theory of vagueness are assumed, such statements cannot have 
indeterminate truth-values.  P3*, therefore, cannot be false. 
 
P1*, P2*, and P3* entail a principle of unrestricted modal composition: for any number 
of worlds wp and any number of objects xq existing in those worlds there is an object y 
that is the minimal M-fusion of xq in wp.  P1* asserts that a restriction on when minimal 
M-fusion occurs requires a continuous series of m-cases where, in at least one m-case, 
minimal M-fusion occurs, and in another m-case, minimal M-fusion does not occur. 
P3* requires a sharp cut-off in the continuous series of m-cases and P2* prohibits a 
sharp cut-off. Therefore, minimal M-fusion always occurs and, where there is minimal 
M-fusion, there are modal parts.14 
 
3. Objecting to UMC 
 
The similarities between UDC and UMC should be clear. An argument against UMC 
will prima facie prompt an analogous argument against UDC. Two objections, 
however, could potentially defeat UMC without defeating UDC. 
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First, since the modal terminology of UMC requires that Lewisian modal realism be 
true, UMC fails because there are independent reasons for holding Lewisian modal 
realism to be false. UDC’s assumption of eternalism does not carry this stigma. I reply 
that the alleged commitment to Lewisian modal realism is only an appearance. The 
modal terminology can easily be translated in such a way that it is consistent with other 
forms of possibilism, though the conclusion of UMC will no longer be that objects can 
have concrete modal parts. For example, if one prefers an ersatzist or abstractionist 
version of possibilism, asserting that possible worlds are abstract objects, then the 
conclusion of UMC would be that objects can have abstract parts and we would expect 
UDC to establish the existence of abstract temporal parts.15 Even under this alteration 
of the possibilist assumption, the conclusion of UMC remains interesting and 
controversial. Nevertheless, the possibilist assumption may not be warranted and, if that 
is the case, then UMC fails to establish the existence of modal parts, whether abstract or 
concrete. Modal fictionalism presents a strong challenge to the legitimacy of UMC 
because, if modal factionalism is true, it will be strange to say that UMC establishes the 
existence of fictional parts. Fictional parts of objects are not modal parts of an object – 
they are not parts of an object at all! Apart from several antecedent issues involved with 
modal fictionalism,16 I would still want the modal fictionalist to provide a good 
explanation for why temporal fictionalism fails. Adhering to modal fictionalism – or 
any kind of actualism, for that matter – without adhering to its temporal analogue in the 
setting of this paper is not dialectically appropriate. 
 
A second objection is the following: UMC does not give one good reason to hold that 
the parthood relation can relate objects that exist in different possible worlds. Certainly 
there are some relations (e.g. spatiotemporal relations) that cannot occur across worlds, 
so UMC further needs to establish that the parthood relation does not fall into this set of 
relations. Additionally, some relations do not “survive” the world-time transition and 
parthood may be such a relation; e.g. ‘before’/‘after’ does not appear to have a modal 
analogue. I reply that we need not hold that the same parthood relation occurs in UMC 
and UDC. There are at least arguments in favor of compositional pluralism, i.e. the 
thesis that there is more than one fundamental parthood relation (McDaniel 2004:142). 
If so, the fact that the temporal parthood relation does not “survive” the world-time 
transition is no problem: there is an analogous modal parthood relation. If it is granted 
that there is a parthood relation that relates entities existing at different times, then we 
can use compositional pluralism and the world-time parallel to argue that there is an 
analogous modal parthood relation that relates entities existing in different worlds. The 
success of UDC and the world-time parallel can now be seen to support UMC and its 
conclusion that objects have modal parts. 
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1 The parthood relation and the composition relation are inverses of one another, so if a 
parthood relation is instantiated, so is a composition relation. 
 
2 The Humphrey objection to counterpart theory:  consider the statement ‘Hubert 
Humphrey might have won the election’. Under counterpart theory, this means that 
Humphrey has a counterpart in some accessible possible world and that counterpart won 
the election. However, Humphrey could not care less about what happens to somebody 
in another possible world, but if Humphrey were identical to his counterpart, then 
Humphrey would care whether ‘Humphrey might have won the election’ is true (Kripke 
1980:45n). 
 
3 Actually, the existence of trans-world composites (and their proper modal parts) is not 
merely assumed. Instead, modal continuant theorists (e.g. Varzi) drop the axiom in 
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Lewisian counterpart theory that individuals must be world-bound, though that seems to 
be an ad hoc way of avoiding the Humphrey objection. 
4 In what follows, I will preface terms with a ‘t’ or an ‘m’/’M’ or a ‘D’ to stand for 
‘temporal’ or ‘modal’ or ‘diachronic’ respectively.  E.g. D-fusion is a diachronic fusion, 
m-case is a modal case of composition, t-part is a temporal part, etc. 
 
5 Where parthood, <, is a primitive mereological notion, overlap is defined as follows:  x 
overlaps y (i.e. x • y) iff (∃z) (z < x ∧ z < y). That is, x overlaps y if and only if 
something is a part of both x and y (Simons 1987:12). 
 
6 Fusion is defined as follows: x is a fusion of class S iff (∀y) [(y∈S → y < x) Λ (∀z)(z < 
x → z • y)]. That is, x is a fusion of S if and only if every member of S is a part of x and 
every part of x overlaps every member of S. I will use ‘fusion’ and ‘composite’ so that 
they bear the same ontological implications. 
 
7 P1 can also be resisted by a mereological essentialist, i.e. one who holds that the parts 
of an object are essential to that object. In this paper I do not have the space to fairly 
consider the objection posed by mereological essentialism (cf. Sider 2001:180-8), so I 
will set aside the issue. 
 
8 Proper parthood, <<, is defined as follows (taking parthood as primitive):  x << y iff 
(∃x)(∃y)(x < y ∧ x ≠ y). Since proper parthood is transitive, gunky objects have a regress 
of proper parts. This is problematic for the mereological nihilist because she holds that 
ordinary objects, like tables and chairs, do not instantiate the parthood relation, but are 
rather ‘molecules-arranged-tablewise’ or ‘particulate-matter-arranged-chairwise’. Since 
the nihilist is committed to the existence of simples (i.e. objects that do not have proper 
parts), gunk is a pressing problem. 
 
9 Temporal parts would be established in this scenario because the sharp cut-off would 
still allow for the existence of at least some minimal D-fusions. From the definition of 
minimal D-fusion, the existence of a minimal D-fusion entails the existence of temporal 
parts. 
 
10 See, for example, Quine (1980) for a defense of the idea that existential quantification 
is a guide to ontological commitment. 
 
11 The entailment arises from considering the principle of unrestricted diachronic 
composition when the number of times is equal to 1.  
  
12 It is important to note that UMC can still succeed without assuming eternalism. 
13 Another suggested sharp cut-off would be to allow minimal M-fusion to occur only 
between objects in worlds that are accessible from each other. 
 
14 Of course, there is a trivial sense in which the existence of a minimal M-fusion 
establishes the existence of modal parts, namely when x is identical to both y and to a 
world-restricted part of y. UMC, however, also establishes a more interesting sense of 
modal parthood: a modal version of perdurantism (Benovsky 2006:153) where objects 
are modally extended composite objects with different parts existing in different 
possible worlds. 
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15 UDC would establish the existence of abstract temporal parts because we would 
expect the move to ersatz possibilism to illicit an analogous move to ersatz eternalism, 
which claims that non-present times are abstract objects. 
 
16 Modal fictionalism suffers from at least four objections that would need to be 
answered prior to invoking this position to block the conclusion of UMC, namely: (i) 
modal fictionalism makes modality too artificial (Nolan 2002:81); (ii) the modal fiction 
must always be incomplete because there are an infinity of true modal statements and 
finite agents could never tell the whole fiction (87); (iii) it is not clear what the truth-
bearers of modal claims can be under modal fictionalism (88); (iv) modal truths become 
redundant under modal fictionalism (93). Although I do not hold that these objections 
are insurmountable, I do hold that these objections need to be satisfactorily dealt with by 
the modal fictionalist before modal fictionalism can be considered a serious threat to 
UMC. 
